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What do We Need to Add to a Social Network to Get a Society?
Answer: Something Like What You Have to Add to a Spatial Network to Get a
City
Bill Hillier
Bartlett School of Graduate Studies, UCL
Abstract
Recent years have seen great advances in social network analysis. Yet, with a few exceptions, the
field of network analysis remains remote from social theory. As a result, much social network re-
search, while technically accomplished and theoretically suggestive, is essentially descriptive. How
then can social networks be linked to social theory? Here we pose the question in its simplest form:
what must we add to a social network to get a society ? We begin by showing that one reason for the
disconnection between network theory and society theory is that because it exists in space-time, the
concept of social network raises the issue of space in a way that is problematical for social theory.
Here we turn the problem on its head and make the problem of space in social network theory explicit
by proposing a surprising analogy with the question: what do you have to add to an urban space
network to get a city. We show first that by treating a city as a naïve spatial network in the first
instance and allowing it to acquire two formal properties we call reflexivity and nonlocality, both
mediated through a mechanism we call description retrieval, we can build a picture of the dynamics
processes by which collections of the buildings become living cities. We then show that by describing
societies initially as social networks in space-time and adding similar properties, we can construct a
plausible ontology of a simple human society.
Keywords: spatial configuration; spatial analysis; architectural theory; spatial networks; social net-
works
1. The problem: societies as space-time networks
For much of the twentieth century, the concept of network was among the most fertile sources of
empirical insights into the working of societies (for overviews see Albrecht, et. Al., 2000; Poole and
Kochen, 1978; also Fischer, 1976; Granovetter, 1982). The concept had the dual advantage of being
both readily quantifiable and permitting the direct investigation of the society as it appears in space-
time. More than any other, the concept of network offered to put sociology on the kind of foundation
we associate with orthodox science by linking mathematical expression to empirical testing. At the
start of the twenty first century it is the concept of social network, and its comparability of networks
occurring in the natural world, that has brought sociology into the common realm of scientific dis-
course (for example Amaral, et al., 2004; Watts, 2003)
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But so far the notion of network has made little impact on social theory. For example, both
Giddens' The Constitution of Society (Giddens, 1984) and Luhmann's Social Systems (Luhmann,
1984), arguably the two most influential social theory texts of the late twentieth century, make liberal
use of the concept of 'system' to express the interconnectedness of things, but do not admit the con-
cept of network as a significant element of theory. No less strikingly, Alan Wilson in his remarkable
synthesis of a century and a half of mathematical geography, Complex Spatial Systems (Wilson,
2000), makes virtually no use of the formal concept of network, even in the section of the book which
looks forward to future developments.
Why should this be? Why should social theory be so reluctant to embrace at a theoretical
level a concept which has proved so potent methodologically? Why should the gap seem if anything
to be widening as network theory advances? The suspicion must be that paradigm issues are involved.
Here it is suggested that they are, and that they are related to the problem of space. Networks are
space-time entities. It is this that makes them so promising methodologically. As space-time entities,
it is natural to follow the usual practice of seeing them, as other space-time phenomena, as the space-
time outputs of whatever underlying processes are creating and sustaining the society. The implica-
tion is that the social network is a dependent variable of the 'real' social processes, just as in spatial
studies the space-time pattern is usually seen as the spatial output of economic processes.
The trouble is, the more it is possible to assign quantifiable structure to a network, the less
likely it seems that it is simply a dependent variable and the more likely it is that the network is in
some sense implicated in system dynamics through its structural properties. But to admit this in the
case of social networks would means to admit a structured space-time entity into social dynamics,
and so potentially into social causation. This is where the paradigm problem may lie: in the linking of
network agency to space-time agency. Admitting the concept of network in this sense would under-
mine any paradigm which, implicitly or explicitly, required the exclusion of space time entities from
social agency, and this means most twentieth century paradigms within which social theories have
been set. In the nineteenth century, of course, writers like Herbert Spencer tries to realize the concept
of society as an organism (Spencer, 1876), and so as a space time entity, but it was perhaps the naïve
physicalism of this attempt that was one factor in giving subsequent authors confidence that any kind
of space time description as a plausible foundation for social theory was to be rejected.
There is in this then a solid reason for social scientists to prefer the notion of 'system' to
express the interconnectedness of things. A 'system' is a set of elements and relations, and so agency
can rest at the level of elements rather than relations. The 'system' concept is thoroughly compatible
with a 'dependent variable only' view of interconnectedness. 'Network' is an altogether more ab-
stracted notion, and describes pure relations while backgrounding the properties of elements. The
notion of network in this sense implies structural agency. This is difficult enough for social theory
within present paradigms. To link it to the issue of spatial agency is enough to lead to its 'structural
exclusion from thought'.
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2. Comparing social and spatial networks
It is here that we can propose a useful parallelism between social and spatial studies, between, that is,
the paradigm issues raised by Giddens and Luhmann formulations and those raised by Wilson's. Both
cities (and the wider regional systems of which they are part) and societies manifest themselves to us
as a primitive space-time networks, primitive in the sense that they offer unmediated and direct expe-
rience in manifestly network form. In cities, it is the network of streets and spaces formed by build-
ings that link the city into a single system. In societies it is the network of interactions that link
individuals into a community or society. But, as with social networks, the primitive spatial network
has usually been rendered invisible in geographical theories of space. As with the social theorists,
Wilson prefers the concept of system, and agency in his system lies in the impact of economic forces
on the 'discrete zone' elements that he divides the city into, and the dynamic interactions between
them, and little follows from the structural properties of the network that connects them other than
through some notion of distance. As with social theories, the space-time system that we are primi-
tively aware of as the city, is assumed to be the space-time output of the 'real' economic processes,
spatialised by distance costs, that drive the city.
This paradigm of the city has however been challenged in recent years by the space syntax
approach, which begins by modeling the naïve network of space and discovering in its structures an
alternative key to the dynamics of the space time city we experience. The paradigmatic novelty of this
approach is that it brings to the fore and seems to find a resolution to the paradoxical problem that we
identified as lying at the heart of social theory. It shows that the space time network which dominates
our direct experience of the city is, not only a dependent variable of social and economic processes,
but also an independent variable in the processes by which collections of building evolve into living
cities. At the same time it internalizes space into the definition of what a city is. It does so through a
precise set of concepts which seem on the face it to offer promise for translation into the study of
social networks.
These are the theme of this paper. We first outline the network based processes through
which space syntax sees the city as evolving, and show they depend on both spatial laws and human
agency working together to create emergent patterns. We then show that to evolve a city from a
spatial network, two concepts must be added which we term reflexivity and nonlocality, both medi-
ated through a universal process mediating the relation between mind and world which we call de-
scription retrieval. We then apply these concepts to space-time social networks, and sug¬gest how
from this a plausible ontology for a simple society can be constructed, one which reflects pervasive
properties of all human societies and at the same time internalizes space into the definition of what a
society is. We begin by looking at the 'city as space-time object', that is, as the patterns of buildings,
spaces and land uses that we would expect to find represented on a map.
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Urban processes: network emergence and network agency
There are two processes which form the space-time city. We can call them network emergence and
network agency. Both happen through the mediation of spatial laws. The first process is the aggrega-
tion of buildings to form emergent patterns of space. This is constrained by simple mathe¬matical
laws which relate the placing and shaping of objects in space to the emergence of configurational
properties in the ambient space. For example, an object placed in the centre of a bounded space will,
ceteris paribus, increase mean trip length and decrease intervisibility from all points to all others in
the ambient space, and so will an elongated object compared to a square object of equal area. As
objects become dense in space, as in cities, the only way to avoid a high trip length labyrinth is to
extend at least some spaces linearly, if necessary at the cost of making others shorter. What we find is
that all cities, however grid like their structure, grow in such a way as to construct a network made up
at every scale of a small number of longer lines, often connec¬ted by 'nearly straight' angles, against
a background of a much larger number of shorter lines, for the most part connected at near right
angles. The former roughly corresponding to the network of major public spaces where public and
economic activity takes place, and the second to the background of predominantly residential space.
This is the process of network emergence (Hillier, 2002).
The second process takes place against this background and is set in motion by the impact of
the emergent network of space on movement within the network. It is this that shapes the emergent
patterns of and uses and densities which give the space-time city its functional character. The process
is as follows. As in any non-uniform network, spatial elements - in this case street segments between
junctions - will vary on standard graph measures of closeness and betweenness. These correspond to
the two components of human movement: the selection of destinations, and the selection of the series
of spaces to pass through to get there. Human trips are on average distributed so that there are more
short trips than long, so the closeness of a node to all others within a defined radius indicates its
potential as a destination from all other nodes up to that radius. Betweenness then measures the
propensity for each node to lie on shortest or simplest (depending how you measure distance) routes
between each pair of nodes in the system. So each measure reflects one component of human move-
ment. This means that we should mathematically expect the structure of the network to have indepen-
dent effects on the pattern of real movement flows, and research since 1987 has amply shown that this
is the case, most strongly so by recent research which shows that people calculate distance using a
geometrical and topological model of the street network rather than direct computations of metric
distance (Hillier and Iida, 2005).
Once we understand the effect of the emergent street network on movement, then the logic
of land use patterns becomes clear. Movement seeking land uses such as retail migrate to locations
which the network has made movement rich, while others such as residence often prefer movement
poor locations. Attractor land uses in movement rich locations than attract more movement, and this
attract other, and more diverse land uses, so setting up multiplier effect by which mixed use patches
emerges in the network roughly in proportions to their positioning in the grid. In this way, cities
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acquire their more or less universal form of a network of linked centres and sub-centres at all scales
set into a background of residential space. In effect, the space of cities is generated by a dual process:
a public space process which is driven largely by micro-economic factors which are invariant and
tend to give cities a similar global structure; and a background residential space process, driven by
cultural factors and thus tend to make cities locally different (Hillier, 1996, 2006).
One implication of this is that space can be, and is, used in two modes. By creating different
movement potentials, and so different densities of movement, space can, on the one hand, be used to
reflect and embody a cultural pattern, as in the residential areas (and even more strikingly in domestic
interiors), where space as laid out to give reality to a culturally given pattern of activity, and so
reinforce and reproduce it. We can call this the conservative use of space, since space is being use to
reflect and so reproduce a given social pattern by controlling and structuring co-presence. On the
other, space can be used to create potential social patterns by morphogenesis, as in the public space
process, since by shaping movement, space also creates a denser pattern of natural co-presence in
space. We can call this the generative use of space, since we are using space to create the potentials for
new co-presence and potentially for social relations. This distinction will be important below when
we talk about social networks (Hillier, 1996, 2006).
The human subject and the city
From the point of view of the problems we described earlier of linking the concept of social network
to theory, this account of the emergence of the space-time city is of some interest. First, it shows that
the spatial network is both a dependent variable of the first, space-creating process, and an indepen-
dent variable in the second 'city-creating' process. Second, it shows that both processes happen within
the constructive constraints imposed by spatial laws. Third, it incorporates both spatial agency and
network agency in a way which does not seem to raise the ghost of spatial determinism. This has been
possible because the spatial network has been put at the heart of the system, and its description as a
separate entity, independent of factors with which it interacts, was the first step in research. Without
this prior description, it would not have been possible to bring to light either the process of network
emergence or that of network agency. In fact, of course, in practices the two processes run concur-
rently, and at every stage both processes are going on and being modified. But at every stage both
processes centre around what we might call the embedded spatial network.
So how can a process which involves both space and laws not be accused of spatial deter-
minism? Two key factors have not so far been brought to the fore. First, all the spatio-temporal events
we have described in the two phases of the process are actions taken by - at least partly knowledge-
able - human individuals or human agencies. Since these events are the means by which the spatial
laws are expressed in space, it follows that the human actions that create the city have in some sense
reflected these laws. Human action, it seems, must be the medium through which spatial laws shape
the emergent city. This is a less surprising idea than it might appear at first sight. When someone
throws a ball of paper so that its parabola leads it to land in a waste paper basket, that person has
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intuited - perhaps even felt - the laws of mathematical physics without of course doing the calcula-
tions. Cognitive science would describe such familiar phenomena as 'intuitive physics'. Similar evi-
dence can be accrued that people intuit the spatial laws we have described in a similar way, so that
spatial behaviour embodies and reflects these laws in the same way as it must embody and reflect
physical laws (Hillier, 2006).
Second, the embedded spatial network has a peculiar property: although the form of the
system has evolved through the first process is bottom-up, its functioning through the second process
is top-down, in the sense that the movement flows which drive the evolution of the system reflect the
position of each space in the large scale configuration, not the local properties of the space. In this
sense, the properties of spaces which are critical to its functioning are non-local and reflect remote, as
well as local, connections. This poses a challenging, and highly interesting, question. In order to
produce the patterns of flows we find, people must be using some kind of non-local internal represen-
tation of the space network with both geometrical and topological properties (Hillier and Iida 2005).
In fact, both the network emergence process and the network agency process depend on a human
ability to cognise the system in order to act on it. In taking decisions about new street alignments to
ensure well formed growth, or working out how to go from a to b in such a way that the functional
dynamics of the city are maintained, both require some kind of non-local picture of the spatial con-
figuration as it exists at that point. Since cities, like any complex space, are such that they can only be
experienced a bit at a time, we can see that this will depends on a prior ability to turn discrete experi-
ences of the bits of the city into a overall picture of some kind - to turn knowledge of routes for
example, into a knowledge of maps, or survey knowledge as cognitive science puts it. This is essen-
tially a process of synchronisation. The experience of the bits is dispersed in time as well as space,
and by building routes into maps, or parts into wholes, we are converting experiences dispersed in
time into synchronic pictures with some kind of 'all at once' geometric order.
Description retrieval
It is worth looking at this process of synchronisation more closely since the next stage of our argu¬ment
in a sense depends on it. It is part of a process we call description retrieval, by which human beings
retrieve abstract information from concrete events (Hillier and Hanson, 1984). Suppose one person
builds a house and another person builds a house next to it, we can see that this is the case in a
concrete sense, but we can also see that one house is in a next to relation to the other (Figure 1). This
relation is symmetrical, in that if a is b's neighbour then b is a's neighbour, unlike, for example, above
or below, or behind and in front which are asymmetrical. By retrieving the abstraction next to from
the event we could then treat it as a rule and follow it, or not as the case may be. So rules do not have
to reside in heads, but can be derived from spatio-temporal events. But that is not all that happens. If
the process continues, a new form emerges. If we do not retrieve a rule and follow it, a random pattern
emerges of which we cannot retrieve a description, but if we do, a linear form emerges. If we vary the
rule, other forms emerge. We are then able to retrieve a description of these by synchronising the
discrete events into an overall shape (Figure 2).
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Is this overall synchronisation distinct from the repetition of the local rule ? We can demon-
strate that it is. In Figure 3, the left figure is no less recursive than the right figure but we only retrieve
is as a repeated local pattern, not as a whole. The one to the right we are more or less able to syncrhonise
as a whole because lines have appeared as a whole, the one on the right clearly so. This process of
synchronisation is the upper level of the description retrieval process, and refers to emergent products
of local activity. We retrieve a template rather than simply a rule. There are good grounds for thinking
that templates are distorted by cognitive input - we make space more orderly than it is - and this
becomes more so as the realities it deals with become more complex. We simplify in order to under-
stand.
Now these two levels of description retrieval (the retrieval of abstract information from
concrete events), the level of the rule and the level of the emergent template, are I believe fundamen-
tal to all the complex system that human beings make and inhabit: not only cities, but cultures, eco-
nomic systems and even whole societies. It is exactly analogous to Levi-Strauss's machines for the
suppression of time (to use Leach's felicitous translation - Leach, 1970). Kinship in human societies,
for example, arises from events similarly dispersed in time and space. But a kinship system, or a set of
kinship rules, synchronises these dispersed events into a logical template. This mechanism for turn-
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Figure 1. The generation of simple
forms from simple rules
Figure 2. Other simply generated forms
Figure 3. By increasing the linear organization from left to right we move from retrieving a local to a global
description
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ing time into the non-time of logical order was the heart of the Levi-Straussian project. It can operate
either by knowing rules, in which case the emergent pattern is poorly understood, but present, or by
knowing the logical system, in which we can use it locally as a problem solving device.
The presence of the description retrieval cycle in a process such as settlement growth im-
parts to it two critical properties we can call reflexivity and nonlocality. Reflexivity means the ubiq-
uitous intervention of human minds first between the forces that bring the city into existence and the
form it takes, and as we have seen reflexivity reflects spatial laws which are known intuitively to
people. Reflexivity between mind and created world, is then not simply a mechanism, but a pervasive
explanation of form. Nonlocality means emergent spatial or functional patterns in systems which
depend on remote rather than proximate elements. The simple fact that human movement depends on
nonlocal factors is the clearest and simplest instance of this, but once the concept is admitted it can be
seen to be quite pervasive both in the network emergence and network agency phases of the process.
So we arrive at a model of the city in which socio-economic processes, human cognition and
spatial laws all played an interconnected role, one which, I suggest, requires us to see the city as a
semi-autonomous system - that is a system which is in part determined by external forces, and in part
structured by into own internal laws, through which these extraneous forces are turned into new and
distinctively urban features of the city. We showed this by internalising space into the model of the
city, and showing that space was the source of its essential forms and dynamics. We also showed that
what we might call the DNA of the city is in its physical and spatial patterns, and we interact with it
through the two level description retrieval and embodiment mechanism. The patterns of the city
embody social information - using the term in its broadest sense - and this is what we aim to retrieve
through syntactic analysis. As was suggested in The Social Logic of Space, a city is like a machine
whose programme is in its output. This is why we must see our urban surroundings as both a spatio-
temporal and informational or conceptual reality.
3. Cities and societies
Now this is something like what Giddens said about society in 1984 (the same year as The Social
Logic of Space was published). Societies, he said, were virtual structures realised and reproduced
through situated practices acted out in space-time. The informational content of society exists in and
in reproduced through spatio temporal activity. His model was language, mine biology (though turned
on its head, in that the dna is exosomatic), but the conceptual model was similar. But Giddens said
little after this. Having shown in principle that space and time can be internalised into social theory,
he does not then try to show how and why it happens. In fact, at the end of the 1984 book he turns
away from space in the real sense of what we find in buildings and cities and replaces it with the - to
my mind - much weaker concept of the spatiality of social and economic processes, just as the old
urban modellers did.
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But the need to internalise space into social theory is an urgent issue, to my mind the out-
standing problem of social theory because without it we cannot say what kind of a thing a society is
(Hillier, 1996). The twentieth century accumulated an array of potent findings pointing to a powerful
and systematic relationship between society and space, but these have never been formalised into a
theoretical model. For example, Durkheim's assignation of the sources of the shift from mechanical
to organic solidarity to what he called 'moral density' (Durkheim, 1915), Service's conclusion that in
Australia greater dispersal was associated with more sodality like behaviour and vice versa (Service,
1962), Turner's cultural comparison of the Talense and the Ndembu and their different settlement
forms (Turner, 1957), to name only a few. In the late twentieth century a substantial array of work
linking real spatial and social processes from authors like Bintliff's work on settlement scales and
social morphology (Bintliff, 1999), Kristiansen and Rowlands on settlement patterns and social struc-
tures (Kristiansen and Rowlands, 1998), Perring on social and spatial changes in Roman towns (and
others in the remarkable Rich and Wallace-Hadrill, 1991), Maisels on spatial and social change in the
four main early urban sites (Maisels, 1999) and many others. While most disciplines have talked
endlessly about space but baulked at the real space of buildings and cities, archaeology has engaged
with this in a thoroughgoing way - but never really called it space. If ever there was a body of work
looking for a spatial theory this is surely it.
My aim here is to suggest that an ontology by which space can be internalized into society,
and the space-time network made central, by making what might seem at first a preposterous com-
parison between society and the city. It is less preposterous perhaps if we call it a comparison between
spatial and social space-time networks. They do after all have a lot in common prima facie: both can
be represented as graphs and shown to share surprising large scale mathematical regularities, for
example in that each has the property of being both sparse - nearly all elements are not connected to
each other - and shallow - graph distances between elements are surprisingly small considering the
number of elements. both kinds of system are dual in the sense that they combine the spatio-temporal
and the informational, so you never get one without the other; both have the DNA 'out there' in the
sense that the material realization contains the genetic information; and both seem to relate to human
cognition through some kind of description retrieval process. What is proposed below adds little to
knowledge. It merely suggests an ontological framework for a society as a spatio-temporal and con-
ceptual system, through which the twentieth century findings and theories and space and society can
make sense together.
4. First steps towards an ontology: the issue of evolution
The most basic question for an ontology of society is: why do human beings form societies in the first
place? The answer must involve evolution, since if societies were did not offer evolutionary advan-
tage, then it is unlikely they would exist. This poses an apparent problem, because the common view
of evolution is that it is driven by competitive struggle of all against all. This seems to many to pose
a problem for understanding societies because although societies may involve competition, in some
more than others, societies are essentially co-operative phenomena, and this is certainly true of the
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simplest societies of which we have a record. Language provides interesting clues. 'Social' behaviour
means cooperative behaviour towards fellow members, and although most people would accept that
there are social benefits in economic competition, we would not normally describe competitive
behaviour as 'social' behaviour - even though in a broader sense it clearly is.
But, on closer examination, the evolution problem for society turns out to be illusory. It
dissolves when we focus on the actual mechanism of evolution rather than its metaphorical embed-
ding. The mechanism of evolution is focused on only one thing: success in producing offspring. The
more certain groups rather than others have more offspring, they more their genetic characteristics
will dominate the future gene pool, and so be more like them than others. As soon as this is clarified,
the supposed contradiction between evolution and society disappears. Societies will be favoured by
evolution if they increase the capability of social members to have offspring, and of course this is
exactly what societies do. This is what societies are and what they are for. Societies favour the pro-
duction of surviving children, because whatever else they are, they are set of interdependencies amongst
individuals which spread risk amongst those individuals, so that if something goes wrong with one
person's circumstances, then others can help, and vice versa. So other things being equal social mem-
bers are statistically more likely to have the dependable and secure circumstances in which they can
produce more progeny than those who are not social members. At root, we might say, societies are
insurance policies: they take risk from the level of the individual to that of the society, so over evolu-
tionary time, human beings who are members of societies are more likely to influence the gene pool
than those who are not.
So in evolutionary terms, a society is at least some network of relations which is projected
through time to makes the interdependencies possible. This suggests that the fact of relatedness may
be more critical than the form of relatedness. Any system of relatedness which allows risk to be
spread would work to give the evolutionary advantage that must be the reason for society's existence.
The fact of being some system of relations is then the foundational notion for society, before we
consider either the specific form those relations take or the causes which brought them into existence.
The function of a society, we might say, is to exist, and through its existence to provide the security
through interdependence that on the evolutionary time space leads to significant advantage. We might
even take this one stage further and suggest that the larger the society, and the more individuals
involved in the system of relations, then the more successful the society could be held to be in evolu-
tionary terms. So other things being equal, evolution is likely to select for those forms of society
which grow large at the expense of those that remain small. If this is so, we do not need to account for
social growth, since evolution would already select in favour of societies which are able to grow.
But scale is also evolutionary issue in a more basic sense. If the existence of a 'society'
means, as seems likely, that members inter-marry with each other more than with non-members, then
the society must be large enough to provide an adequate genetic diversity. Mathematical models
suggest that this cannot fall below about 500 members. This has a critical implication for an ontology.
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Since in the simplest situations most environmental circumstances requires people to live in cohabit-
ing groups of a size well below the intermarrying threshold, it follows that for a repro¬ducible society
to be created, it must succeed in creating durable relations across spatial groups, and so non-local
relations. So society, if it is to exist, must respond to two kinds of pressure to create a non-local
grouping which is much very much larger than the co-residence group. This is of course what societ-
ies are in the first instance: they are arrangement of exchange and interde¬pendence between co-
habiting groups. This is the first step in our ontology. 'Society' must be sought initially in the nonlocal
relations among dispersed co-habiting groups, not within the local cohabiting group - though we
would expect signs of the nonlocal society also to appear there.
Societies as space-time networks
Within this framework, a society is first and foremost a network existing in a spatial region within
which there are a number of local cohabiting groups. This network will be sustained by social prac-
tices, but these social practices are the means by which the network is realized and reproduced, not
the society itself. It is not the social practices that gives evolutionary advantage, but the network they
create and sustain. So if anything it is the network which comes closer to being at the heart of what a
society is. In what follows, we will see social practices as means of creating, controlling and mutating
theses networks and their structures, especially under conditions of growth.
As with the city, then, we can and should put the graph of the social network at the heart of
our model, and propose that for an evolutionary advantageous society to exist in the form of a net-
work of local and nonlocal groupings there must be two things:
o mechanisms for overcoming space to create the non-local grouping - we could call them
mechanisms for overcoming dispersal, or even for overcoming space
o mechanisms for controlling local space, that is securing the local grouping against dispersal,
for example by having ways to settle disputes short of fission
The two interact in that fission of the local group can be a means to create the non-local
grouping, and the non-local grouping will often means a means to create and re-create the local
group. But in general we can say that to come into existence, society has to solve two spatial prob-
lems: roughly those posed by dispersal and those posed by proximity.
Spatial and conceptual groupings
How are the non-local relations created? In some simple societies this is a matter of exchanging
people with high frequency, so that the very fluidity of the spatial group is a means by which a larger
scale social network is continuously recreated (Lee and Devore, 1968; Sahlins, 1974). Moving to
another group is also a standard way of solving disputes within the local group. Almost universally,
however, we find that societies define, over and above local, or spatial, groups, groups which are
defined non-spatially in that membership is defined by a label, and so can be thought of as conceptual
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groupings. Households, villages and universities are spatial groupings. Families, clans and academic
disciplines are conceptual groupings, and so independent of space. The former exist within a spatially
defined domain, while the latter exist regardless of how they are distributed in space. Conceptual
groupings have distinct forms and patterns of social behaviour associated with them, as do spatial
groupings. For example, ceremonial and ritual activity may be, and often is, organised through the
conceptual grouping.
Where then do social labels come from? In general we can say: by description retrieval from
the spatio-temporal graph, and so by reflexivity. At the simplest level social labels like sister or father
are the roots of j-graphs (that is, graphs justified from a node considered as root) of sets of relations,
and each node in the graph acquires a label which implies all the others. Social behaviours appropri-
ate to the label then inherit the formal properties of their position in the graph, so in metaphorical
extensions 'sisterly' behaviour reflects the symmetry of the sister relation, and so equality, while
fatherly behaviour reflects the asymmetry of the parental relation, and so inequality. A clan system, in
contrast, is a template retrieved from the space time graph by synchronising events dispersed in space
and time - birth, reproduction and death - into a time-free logical picture. Clans can also inherit the
formal properties of their space time origins. A conical clan, for example, is a clan formed from
descent from a single ancestor, and so founded on an asymmetric principle which we would expect to
find reflected in hierarchical clan behaviour reflecting the asymmetries. In this sense, the way in
which we simplify and so bring order into complex social networks seems to resemble the way we do
it to cognise spatial networks: we turn relations into abstractions and order them into formal geo-
metrical and logical schemes, which are, as a consequence, are likely to be neater and clearer than
their space-time origins.
Figure 4a   In the first case, being a member of the blue or pink clan corresponds to spatial group membership,
so everyday and ceremonial activities associated with the clan reinforce the same group. Local identities
become stronger, and non-local weaker. The spatial group will need stronger boundary control, and stronger
internal rules, to keep it blue or pink. In practice, we tend to find groups of this kind are territorial and
internally hierarchical.
Figure 4b  In the second case, being in the blue or pink clan does not correspond to spatial group
membership, so everyday activity merges blues and pinks, and ceremonial activities reinforce non-local
blue or pink connections, and so increases the density of the non-local network at the expense of the local.
Local boundaries are weaker as there is no need to control for colour. In this model the non-local network
is stronger, and local identities weaker. Freeing the local group from ceremonial identity allows local political
interaction to become stronger. In practice, we tend to find such societies less hierarchical, less territorial
and more political.
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System of labels in general, are then reflexive constructions from the space-time graph, with
abstract properties as well as space time realisations. As soon as they exist, they create potential for
some socio-spatial dynamics. Consider two cases in which we have two spatial, or cohabiting, groups
and two conceptual labels, say the pink and the blue. In one the membership of the spatial group and
tconceptual groups correspond, in another they do not. So if, in the 'correspondence' case, being a
member of the blue or pink clan corresponds to spatial group membership, so that all members of the
group are the same colour, then everyday activities and ceremonial activities associated with the
conceptual group reinforce the same group of people. Local identities will become stronger, and non-
local weaker. The spatial group will tend to need boundary control, and stronger internal rules, to
preserve its single colour. In practice, we tend to find groups of this kind are territorial and internally
hierarchical. In the non-correspondence case, being blue or pink does not correspond to spatial group
membership, so everyday activity merges blues and pinks, while ceremonial activities re-inforce non-
local blue or pink connections, and so increases the density of the non-local network at the expense of
the local. Local boundaries are weaker as there is no need to control for colour. In this model the non-
local network is stronger, and local identities weaker. But freeing the local group from ceremonial
identity allows local political interaction to become stronger. In practice, we tend to find such societ-
ies less hierarchical, less territorial and more political.
A third possible relation between structure and dynamics Figure 4c, we can call differential
solidarities model. In this case, blues only have relations with blues in the other spatial group, and
pinks only have relations with pinks in the same spatial group. This means that the two groups not
only have relations which are spatially different - pinks only have local relations and blues only have
non-local relations - but relations which are of a different kind. Blues are likely to use more long
models to form relations at a greater distance while pinks are likely to use shorter models to form
relations which are primarily local These are the kinds of spatial and cultural differences that are
characteristics of class systems, where differences in cultural behaviour are associated with differ-
ences in the spatial ranges of networks. Differential solidarities of this kind will arise to the extent that
Figure 4c. Now consider a third case in the blue and pink model. We can call it the differential solidarities
case: blues only have relations with blues in the other spatial group, and pinks only have relations with
pinks in the same spatial group. This means that the two groups not only have relations which are spatially
different - pinks only have local relations and blues only have non-local relations - but relations which are
of a different kind. Blues are likely to use more long models to form relations at a greater distance while
pinks are likely to use shorter models to form relations which are primarily local. These are the kinds of
spatial and cultural differences that are characteristics of class systems, where differences in cultural
behaviour are associated with differences in the spatial ranges of networks. Differential solidarities of this
kind will arise to the extent that particular groups have special access to the means of social reproduction,
that is the to means of reproducing inter spatial group relations. It is exactly this situation that Yoffee
suggests arose in the Ubaid period in Mesopotamia that preceded the formation of cities.
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particular groups have special access to the means of social reproduction, that is to the means of
reproducing inter spatial group relations. As we will see, it is this kind of situation that has been
suggested to have arisen in the Ubaid period in Mesopotamia that preceded the formation of cities.
Graph generating and graph-directed behaviour: short and long models
The distinction between spatial and conceptual groupings also relates to another invariant across
societies. All societies deploy resources and activity at two levels: the level of everyday production of
the material conditions of life, and so the biological survival of individuals; and at a level devoted to
seemingly biologically unnecessary activities which serve to reproduce social relations. One expres-
sion of this is the difference between everyday events, with their short term recursion periods, and
special, more ceremonial events, like births, marriages, deaths, seasonal festivities and so on, which
have longer term recursion periods. We can call the upper level the reflexive level, since the object of
its behaviours is to reproduce existing patterns in the space-time graph. Its behaviours can be seen as
graph-directed, while behaviours at the lower level generate graph relations as a by-product. Where
we find templates operating at this upper level we call them institutions or institutional structures.
We find different kinds of behaviour associated with the two levels. All human encounters
are made up of two elements; the space time elements of co-presence and interaction; and the abstract
elements such as labels, classification and rules which shape the form the interaction takes. The
spatio-temporal aspects are the hardware of social transactions, the labels and rules the software. The
software however has some very interesting dynamic properties of its own. In all societies human
encounters vary on the dimension formal-informal. For example, where encounters are asymmetric
we find more formal content - use of titles and forms of address, more formal language, special
behaviours, and so on. We can conceptualise this as the ratio of rules to events: the higher the ratio the
more formal, the less the more informal, and index it as the length of the string of symbols we must
write to describe the rules that control events. The longer the sequence of symbols required - the
longer the model - the more the spatio-temporal event is formal, and the shorter the required string,
that is the shorter the model the more that is allowed to vary randomly and the less formal it is, while
retaining some degree of conceptual intervention.
The limiting case of a long model event is the ritual: everything must happen in a certain
sequence, be carried out be certain people, follow an exact format, and so on, so that it would take
many symbols to write the formula down. But everyday life also varies across cultures and with
phases of culture in the length of model. So while all human encounter is rule governed in some
sense, the degree to which it is rule-governed is a variable, and this variable can be in prin¬ciple
quantified (though in reality only with great difficulty). The length of the model indexes the degree of
conceptual intervention in a space time event. Now the longer the model is the more the events are
reproductive of patterns that already exist, because more of what happens is governed by the rule;
while the shorter the model, the more the events lead to morphogenesis in the system of relations,
because less of what goes on in the space-time encounter field is rule governed and more is randomised.
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A ritual is a reinforced description of relations that already exist in society and this is why it has a long
model. This mirrors the distinction between the conservative and genera¬tive mode of creating space,
in a more precise form. There are more rules in conservative space.
Long and short models have their own socio-spatial and temporal dynamics. In everyday
life, activity patterns will tend to have a shorter recursion period, involve a great deal of everyday
activity, and bring together a local group and use a short model, that is a low ratio of rules to events;
while ceremonial activities will tend to have a longer recursion period, take the form of special events
rather than everyday activity, and involve a wider group of people and use a longer model, that is a
higher ratio of rules to events. So time is involved as well as space, time being a kind of distance. We
can generally we can say that the shortness of the model is inverse to spatial and social distance. This
is why it is in the nature of things that the ceremonial fund is essentially the non-local fund, and why
we tend to find the 'social' more in the relations between spatial groups than within them. It is the
primary means by which society creates a non-local network and it is the primary means by which
space and time are internalised into society.
An ontological model for society as a space-time network
We can now outline an ontological model for society based on these ideas. Figure 5 The foundation is
the space-time graph and the model is about what we have to add to it to arrive at a society. The
horizontal axis distinguishes the spatial from the conceptual, and the vertical the nonreflexive from
the reflexive. Bottom left we have everyday life in which elementary 'descriptions' in the graph,
which may or may not be 'description-retrieved', are generated by co-presence. Bottom right is the
conceptual content of these co-presences. Top right we have the realm of ceremony and ritual through
which template level conceptual content are realised in space-time through enactment. Top left we
have the negotiation and control of template level descriptions, or the realm of politics.
Figure 5  An ontological model for a society as a space-time network. Note that the word 'transpatial' is
used to express the independence of conceptual descriptions from space, so they work naturally across
space.
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Simplifying, we can see that the left side unreflexive level of activity can be seen as graph generative
activity in that it continually poses new co-presences as candidates for description retrieval as endur-
ing relations in the graph, while the right side can be thought of as the conditions of reproduction for
those relations. The upper reflexive level can be conceptualised as graph-directed activity, aimed at
the structure of the network itself, either by reinforcing its patterns by embodying them in enriched
description realisations we call rituals, or by seeking to solve problems that arise as society grows and
changes, the realm of politics and law.
5. Society is how we overcome space
Society is then an evolutionary advantageous form that is achieved by overcoming space by using
reflexive mechanisms to create non-local relations. Ecological factors like environment, technology
and density, and so the conditions for the production of biological survival, set the problem which is
solved by how space is overcome. So in conditions in which people can only survive sparsely, society
will have to overcome dispersion, while under conditions of density the problems will one of proxim-
ity. Exactly what mechanisms evolve in a particular society could involve chance, in that any set of
social practices which realised advantageous non-local groupings in a stable way could and perhaps
would become normative in that society simply because they created the conditions of evolutionary
advantage. This 'normative hypothesis' would even make sense of random variation in social forms,
as well as permitting dramatic change to take place.
But under conditions of growth, different mechanisms would be activated. If there are a
number of spatial groups in a landscape and population increases, then either the number or the size
of groups must increase, or both. Figure 6 If the number increases, the problem remains that of
dispersion and, since under dispersed conditions non-local integration tends to happen through the
conceptual groupings and associated ritual, rather than politics, this should leads to ritual intensifica-
tion as the mean of holding the society together. If the size of groups increases then the problem shifts
from overcoming dispersion to overcoming the problems of proximity. The left side reflexive level of
the model - politics, dispute settlement and so on - is prioritised over the right, ceremonial side. This
is why with urbanisation a large proportion of the complexity of 'tribal' societies eventually disap-
pears, including elaborate kinship systems and associated forms of ritual.
Our model then suggests that one of the great discontinuities in human social history from
tribal to urban reflexive structures actually arises from what societies are and how they can be created
under different spatial conditions. So by seeing societies by analogy with space as spatio-temporal
graphs with reflexivity and nonlocality, we can internalise space into our model of society and cap-
ture some significant interactions between the social and spatial dimensions.
57
Journal of Space Syntax, Volume 1, Issue 1, Pages 41-58, 2010
One final observation. Our analysis of cities suggested that we needed to see the spatial
network as a semi-autonomous system meaning that although clearly shaped and driven by exog-
enous economic and social forces, we do not understand exactly how this is so unless we also under-
stand that it also evolves under the scope of internal spatial laws. In fact it is through the intermediary
of these laws that economic and social processes are able to express themselves in space. The same is
surely true of societies. What we name as 'society' seems to be a semi-autonomous system in some-
thing like the same sense.
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